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Abstract 
The paper addresses the issue of “fake news” through a well-known and widely studied 
experiment that illustrates a possible science behind the phenomenon.  Public news is viewed 
as an aggregation of decentralized pieces of valuable information about complex events.  Such 
systems rely on accumulated investment in trust in news sources. In the case of fake news, 
news source reliability is not known.  The experiment demonstrates how fake news can destroy 
both the investment in trust and also the benefits that news provides.  
 
A. Introduction1 
   
While fake news, propaganda and misinformation are not newly emergent phenomena the 
public’s recognition of their growth is found in many sources.  Each of the major news 
networks, CNN, NBC, and Fox News, consistently publish remarks about a competitor’s lack of 
reliability.  Different sides of the political divide accuse each other of promoting fake news, and 
the “main stream” media is accused of taking sides.  Analysis finds different reasons for growth 
including underlying economics that rewards “click baits”, an erosion of moral fiber and even 
espionage.  Against that background, sources express concerns about the consequences of the 
tendency. Bloomberg suggests direct damages to wealth through an effect of fake news on the 
stock market.2 Others have expressed concerns about long-term consequences.  For example, 
politician Hillary Clinton points to the possibility of systemic damage due to a leveling effect or 
“false equivalency” in which the unreliable news sources and reliable sources are regarded as 
equals.3   
 
The underlying concerns about the consequences of fake news rest on more than intuition or 
impressions. Scientific support appears to exist. Simple experimental exercises illustrate that 
basic principles of information processes that are known to be features of markets can also 
operate for public sources of information and broader decisions influenced by news.  News 
from public sources can enhance efficiency and create economic benefits for the same reasons 
that improved information enhances market efficiency.  The experiments also illustrate that the 
benefits that emerge from reliable news can be systematically disrupted by fake news.  The 
                                               
1  The help of B. Atsavapranee, is gratefully acknowledged. All experimental programs were designed by Travis 
Maron. The technical contributions of Hsing Yang Lee were very helpful. The financial support of the John 
Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.  
2 (Cite: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-23/why-fake-news-is-so-harmful-to-investors) 
3 The comments are her assessment of academic research as contained in her 2018 Author Miller Freedom to 
Write Lecture at the 14th Annual Pen World Voices Festival, April 14, 2018. 
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experiments explore a specific basic principle that suggests how and why associated benefits 
are lost.   
 
The experiments are narrowly focused and thus do not address many of the important issues. 
Of course, news is a deep part of social fabric, and policies that shape its role, such as freedom 
of the press, are widely recognized as a cornerstone of a free society.4  
 
The experiments reflect the perspective of F. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”5, which 
is now integrated with economic theory and finance as well as political theory.  The basic 
principles apply to a world in which information is produced from decentralized sources of 
observation.  Information originates locally as a product of the actions of those close to the 
facts and with interests aligned with the use of the facts.  The information becomes transferred 
and aggregated through publicly observed actions, such as trades and trading prices in which 
good information and incentives to act quickly are closely related.  In a statistical sense, the 
information contained in scattered observations can become aggregated, pooled, and 
processed.6 The resulting knowledge is a resource, a type of “public good”, that can be used 
multiple times and grants economic value by preventing costly mistakes. 
 
Trust in the reliability of information sources is fundamental to the process.  Typically, trust is 
derived from an alignment between incentives and the information revealing actions.  For 
example, people normally visit a restaurant because they like the food, and thus, the number of 
customers can be a source of information about the quality of the restaurant.  Or, the location 
of fishermen suggests information about the location of fish.  Analogously, in markets, the 
upward movement of a stock price suggests the possibility of favorable earnings because those 
who have uncovered favorable facts have an incentive to buy the stock before others do. When 
incentives and information revealing actions are aligned, the actions can reveal information 
that can be trusted and used.  On the other hand, if incentives and actions are not aligned, the 
information revealed can become a type of “fake news” that is misleading and can lead to 
costly mistakes.  Experience contributes to an understanding about the reliability of 
information. For instance, the diners and fishermen will ignore information if it is known to be 
unreliable. That is, if customers are known to be paid by the owner to sit at a restaurant, or if 
boats are known to be populated by sightseers as opposed to fishermen, the diners and 
fishermen will ignore the actions knowing that no information is carried by observed behavior. 
                                               
4 The founders were very clear in their thinking about the matter.  “Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free 
government: When this support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved,” wrote Benjamin 
Franklin in The Pennsylvania Gazette. John Adams felt that “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of 
the state” and Thomas Jefferson held similar opinions holding that “Our liberty depends on the freedom of the 
press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.” 
5Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American economic review, 35(4), 519-530.; Hayek, F. A. 
(1948). Individualism and economic order. University of Chicago Press. 
6 The information aggregation phenomenon was first demonstrated in market experiments by Plott and Sunder 
(1982, 1988). Recent applications of the basic principles to complex experiments and field settings can be found at 
Court, McKenzie, Plott, and Gillen (2018).  
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If incentives and actions are not aligned to produce reliable information, the use and value of 
public news suffer.  
 
A key feature of the model is a principle of “information revealing choices/behavior”.  If an 
observer knows the motivations of a decision maker, then the observer can use the decisions 
made to make an inference about what the decision maker knew at the time of the decision.  
That is, if a decision maker’s incentives are known, then their choice of actions can give insights 
about the information on which the choice was made – a type of “invertability”.  The fact that 
people can make this deduction, even though not always successfully, suggests the processes 
through which fake news finds its way to making an impact.  If the bias of a source is known, an 
observer can compensate for the bias and extract the hidden information as if the bias did not 
exist. On the other hand, if the incentives are not known, then a foundation for collecting and 
using the information does not exist.  The news carries no information aside from the fact that 
it cannot be trusted. 
 
B. Behavioral Principles  
 
A simple experiment is used to demonstrate four fundamental points. First and most basic are 
the facts that (i) trusted news is a key feature of information aggregation and (ii) the 
aggregated information creates economic value.  The improved information leads to better 
decision-making that becomes directly translated into improved income, which can be 
measured in the experiment.  (iii) Successful aggregation depends on the confidence placed by 
decision makers on the reliability of an information source.  The confidence is derived from the 
decision makers’ understanding of the alignment of the source’s incentives and reports derived 
from actions taken by the source.  Do the reports from the source accurately reflect the 
information held by the source?  Do the actions taken by the source, possibly adjusted for 
known biases, accurately reflect what the source knows? (iv) Finally, if the confidence in the 
information source or the aggregation process is damaged then the value created by the 
information is lost.  The confidence reflects a building process, a type of social investment in a 
“public good” resulting from time and experience. 
 
Together the experiments illustrate how fake news can destabilize and erode the foundation of 
the information building process and cause a loss of the potential economic value.  The 
experiments demonstrate how fake news can be economically damaging through an erosion of 
a major resource –knowledge. Such erosion could be damaging in other ways as well, e.g. 
socially. 
 
C. The Experiment and Overview  
 
Three experimental conditions are studied.  The first condition is a case in which news sources 
can be trusted, i.e. no fake news.  The second condition is a condition in which both the sources 
of inaccurate news and associated biases are known to all, i.e. known fake news. The third 
condition is one in which all know about the possibility of fake news but it cannot be objectively 
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identified as such. The reader of the news cannot reliably differentiate unreliable news from 
reliable news, i.e. unknown fake news. 
 
Naturally, the experiment is a very simple case where the principles can be observed.  The three 
conditions studied are all based on the same set experimental setting.7 Two urns have three 
balls each.  One of the urns has two red balls and one white. Call this the red urn.  The other urn 
has two white balls and one red. Call this the white urn. One of these urns, called the chosen 
urn, is selected at random at the beginning of a period (50:50).  The subjects do not know which 
urn was chosen but each subject is privately shown a random draw of one ball from the chosen 
urn. The subject gives a (public) report reflecting the subject’s guess about the color of the 
chosen urn, red urn or white urn.  The earnings of the subject depend on the report and the 
actual color of the chosen urn.  Different conditions involve different reporting incentives that 
will be called “normal” or “reverse” as will be described next. All subjects know their own 
reporting incentives. Subjects draw from the chosen urn and report in sequence and all subjects 
observe all previous reports.  The ball is replaced after each subject draws. 
 
In the no fake news condition, subjects have incentives to report the actual urn used to make 
the draw, called “normal incentives”.  Of course, they do not know definitively but they have 
incentives to make a correct report and the incentives are common knowledge.  In the no fake 
news condition, the subject earns a monetary reward (+$1.50 in the experiment) if the report is 
correct and loses money (-$0.50) if the report is incorrect.  Since the urns are chosen with equal 
probability, the best report based on a single, isolated draw is the color of the revealed ball. 
That is, subjects with normal incentives report red urn if the ball is red and report white urn if 
the ball is white.   
 
In the known fake news condition some subjects have normal incentives to report the actual 
urn used, and three randomly chosen subjects have incentives to report the urn NOT used. 
These three have “reverse” incentives and all subjects know which reports were made by 
subjects with reverse incentives.  Given their information, those with reverse incentives can 
make their own determination about the actual urn and use that determination to form a 
report.  Those with reverse incentives earn a monetary reward (+$1.50 in the experiment) if the 
report is the urn not used and lose money (-$0.50) if the report is the actual urn.  Again, since 
the choice of the urn is 50/50, in the absence of additional information the best report is the 
color of the revealed ball for those with normal incentives (draw x and report x) but the 
opposite color for those with reverse incentives (draw x and report y). 
 
In the unknown fake news condition subjects know that some subjects might have reverse 
incentives but they do not know the number or location of subjects with reverse incentives. All 
                                               
7 The experiment was first introduced by Anderson and Holt (1997).  Information and efficiency measures were 
developed by Hung and Plott (2001) who also replicated the Anderson and Holt results. The experiments are based 
on theoretical models developed by Banerjee (1992) and by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). Willinger 
and Ziegelmeyer (1998) and Ziegelmeyer, Koessler, Bracht and Winter (2010) study cases in which participants 
receive different qualities of information and show that subjects with more accurate private signals correct 
inaccurate information aggregation. 
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subjects know their own incentives but not the incentives of others. Other features of the 
experiment are exactly the same as the other two conditions. 
 
In all conditions, all other subjects observe the report of the first subject but not the color of 
the ball that was shown to the first subject, and they do not know if the first subject reported 
correctly or not.  A second subject is chosen at random.  The experimenter uses the same urn 
as before, draws one ball at random and reveals it to the second subject who makes a guess 
about the urn and makes a public report on the urn.  All other subjects observe the report.  The 
ball is replaced in the urn.  A third subject is chosen at random and shown a ball drawn at 
random from the same urn as the previous two subjects.  The third subject reports on the urn, 
and all other subjects observe the report. The process continues until all subjects have made a 
report about the actual urn.  Again, all subjects know that unless the incentives are reverse a 
subject earns $1.50 if the subject reported the actual urn but loses $0.50 if the subject reported 
the other urn. If the subject has reverse incentives the incentives are the opposite and in that 
sense the subject has an incentive to report “fake news”. 
 
Now, notice the information the third subject in the sequence has available as a result of the 
“news” of the previous two subject reports.  If subject three believes the previous two subjects 
are rewarded by accuracy in the sense of reporting the correct urn and that the two other 
subjects want to make as much money as possible, then the reports carry information about 
the color of the drawn balls revealed to them.  Thus, at the time of decision in the no fake news 
condition the third subject has information about three draws, the two previous subjects and 
his/her own draw. The optimal choice is dictated by the proportion of colors in the sample.  If 
two or three are of the same color, then the best choice of urn is that color.  
 
The value and productivity of the “news” can be theoretically computed and compared with the 
observed.  If an individual has no private information and no news, then a natural model of 
choice would be random with 50% being correct and 50% being incorrect.  The expected payoff 
would be $0.50 per period.  If each individual has a private source of information, the private 
draw, then by using it as the basis of a decision they will choose the correct urn with 67% 
probability and the incorrect urn 33% of the time with an expected value of $0.83 (purely 
theoretical). If the calculation is based on the actual draws that were used in the experiment as 
opposed to the probabilities, then on average the value is $.79.  
 
If an individual has access to news such as the reports of others, the information can be added 
to the information provided by the individual’s private draw.  In the case of no fake news if all 
individuals use the data from reports (the “news”) then “herds” or “cascades” will be observed 
in which all decisions are eventually the same, which would lead to all making the correct 
choice approximately 75% of the times and incorrect 25% producing a per person expected 
value of, $1.01.8  It is important to realize that such conformity is not accidental and is, indeed, 
                                               
8 The perfect cascading result was calculated by considering if each subject reports based on their draw unless the 
majority public information plus the private draw contradicts the private draw, in which case the subject would 
7 
 
beneficial as this value is higher than $0.79 that would be obtained if all subjects disregarded 
the public information.  
 
D. Experimental Design and Procedures 
  
Four experimental sessions were conducted on four different days.  Each session used ten 
subjects for a total of forty subjects.  Each session consisted of unpaid practice periods ranging 
from 5 to 10 and three experimental conditions. Subjects made fifteen reports under each of 
the conditions.  The major features for all experiments are in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Experimental design: dates conditions, periods, 
experiment 20180207 20180228 20180305 20180411 
Number of subjects 10 10 10 10 
Average Total Earnings per 
person ($) 
36.3 40.1 35.5 36.3 
Experiment length 1.5 hours 1.5 hours 1.5 hours 1.5 hours 
Subjects 
EEPS lab 
Caltech 
students 
Caltech 
students 
Caltech 
students 
Caltech 
students 
     
Condition  periods periods periods periods 
 Unpaid Practice          
 fake news 
1-5 
 
1-5 
 
1-5 
 
1-5 
 
No Fake News  
Paid Practice (unused) 
Data used 
 
* 
6-20 
 
6-10 
11-25 
 
6-10 
11-25 
 
6-10 
11-25 
Fake known  21-35 26-40 26-40 26-40 
Unknown fake  36-50 41-55 41-55 41-55 
*For experiments 20180228, 20180305, and 20180411, the No Fake News condition has 5 extra 
practice rounds (rounds 6-10), and the data from these rounds were not used in the data 
analysis (they were treated as the other practice rounds). 
 
Subjects were Caltech students recruited using the recruiting system of the Caltech Laboratory 
for Experimental Economics and Political Science (EEPS) and reported to the Caltech EEPS 
laboratory.  Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were randomly seated at a station with 
screening partitions and a computer and were instructed to not talk or communicate.  
 
All experiments were conducted in the same manner. When participants walked into the room, 
they were given colored PowerPoint instructions (see Appendix), a table to fill out during the 
experiment (about information such as their incentive type and per-round payoffs), and a 
                                               
report based on the public information. All subjects consider the incentives behind each report. Over 15 rounds, 
the 10 subjects earn $151 total using this method, so the per person expected value per round is $1.01, 
approximately 75% correct and 25% incorrect. 
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writing utensil. Each participant was guided to a seat with a computer, without view of any 
other computers or individuals; no communication of any kind was allowed except for 
questions to supervisors. After all 10 people read instructions, the instructions were 
summarized (specifically, incentive types and how to use the program), and initial questions 
were answered individually. Then, several simple examples were shown on the board in the 
style of the program to be used. Examples included: [If I have normal incentives] (I) If the first 2 
people chose red, and I drew red, then I should choose red; (II) If the first person chose white, 
the second chose red, and I drew red, then I should choose red; (III) If the first person chose 
red, and I drew white second, then given a slight confidence in my choice over someone else, I 
should choose white; (IV) If the first 2 people chose red, but the first two people have reverse 
incentives, and I drew white, then I should choose white. (V) If I have reverse incentives, and 
the first 2 people (normal incentives) chose white, and I drew white, then I should choose red. 
 
After these examples, individual questions were answered. All programs were initiated for the 
practice rounds, during which people could ask final questions. After the practice rounds, no 
further questions were answered. People were reminded if parameters changed at the start of 
new periods. At the end of the experiment, participants calculated their total earnings, 
excluding the practice rounds, and were presented cash accordingly. 
 
E. Measurements 
  
Subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency of the news system depended on the incentive structure 
and the decisions subjects made.  The subject had incentives to make a correct report about 
either which urn was used to make the draw or the opposite, the urn that was NOT used to 
make the draw. The incentives differed across experimental conditions. 
Normal incentive: If the subject reports the “correct urn”, the urn from which the ball was 
drawn, the subject earns $1.50 and loses $0.50 if the report is not the correct urn.  
Reverse incentive: If the subject reports the “incorrect urn”, the urn from which the ball was 
not drawn, the subject earns $1.50 and loses $0.50 if the subject reports the correct urn (the 
urn from which the ball was drawn). 
 
E.1. Efficiency Measurements 
Typically, efficiency reflects the wealth produced by a process.  In these types of experiments, it 
is the money earned by participants relative to the maximum that could have been earned.  
When earning depends on information the measurement must be adjusted to the information 
possibilities. 
 
Complete information standard: The complete information standard reports efficiency relative 
to the hypothetical case in which there is complete public sharing of all draws before any 
choices are made. From the actual draws used in the experiment, it was calculated that if all 
subjects are informed of all draws before making a choice, the expected value for a condition 
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(15 rounds) is $16.5 per person.9 This means that in 12 out of 15 rounds, aggregating all the 10 
private signals would lead to the choice of correct state of the world. For reference, there is 
79% probability that six or more signals would be from the correct urn.  Thus, 100% efficiency 
according to this measure is based on all available information even though potentially 
impossible to use due to the timing or incentives. 10 
 
F. RESULTS 
 
Four classes of results are reported.  The first result demonstrates that the principles work by 
measuring the wealth created by a news delivery system to an identical economic environment 
in which no news system exists.  The second result is a demonstration that a news system that 
carries fake news can function well if the sources of fake news and the nature of the fake news 
are known in the sense that the motivation of those reporting the news is known.  An 
understanding of the incentives of those reporting the news works as part of a correct 
interpretation.  The third result demonstrates that fake new has a negative impact on the value 
of an information reporting process.  If fake news sources cannot be distinguished from reliable 
news sources, then the benefits of news are lost.11 The system tends to revert to the case 
where no news is available.  The final result focuses on the process by illustrating that the value 
of news is a product of an investment in learning that builds with experience, and in the 
presence of fake news the investment value becomes eroded.       
 
A comparison between reliable news and no news at all is made possible by experiment 1 The 
appropriate measures from a technical computation when no news exists are in Table 2 and are 
presented with measures from reliable news produced by experiment 1. The comparison is 
reported as Result 1.   
 
 
 
                                               
9 From the actual draws used in the experiment, 1 of the 15 rounds had a tie between the two colors. To account 
for this in the hypothetical complete information standard, half of the subjects gained money and half lost money. 
10 All efficiencies were calculated by analyzing the actual draws people were given. 
Other efficiency measures are possible including efficiency relative to “completely rational” behavior of others. 
The measure is based on the assumption that all other individuals use statistics properly and all assume that all 
others do as well. This means that in the absence of tied reports all individuals after the first 3 choose according to 
the majority signal of the first 3 people. If the first two choices disagree with the third person’s draw, then the 
third person also chooses according to the first 2 people. If the first two choices disagree then the third person 
follows own signal.  The fourth person can be placed in the same position as the third and in this case the analysis 
is repeated.   Because this measure is sensitive to the first three draws it can exhibit variability of performance and 
efficiencies above 100%.  Each such instance requires additional explanation and thus the measure has deficiencies 
as an explanatory and comparison tool. 
11 Hung and Plott (2001) study a case with social pressures for conformity in which people are punished for reports 
that diverge from the reports of others.  The results demonstrate that incentives for conformity have the capacity 
to remove almost all benefits of news. The very first report has an impact of blocking the information content of all 
additional reports as subsequent reports acquire conformity and avoid punishment by matching the content of the 
first report. 
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Result 1. Reliable news creates additional value compared to the case when only private 
information exists. This occurs through a reporting and information aggregation process.  If 
news from a public source is reliable (the absence of fake news) information becomes 
aggregated through a reporting process and the resulting knowledge becomes an additional, 
productive source of value creation. 
 
Support.  Table 2 demonstrates that in comparison with the identical system that has only 
private news sources, no public news, the existence of a reliable news source (no fake news) 
generates benefits in all dimensions of comparison. Total income goes up by 4.62%, the percent 
of correct (income earning) decisions goes up by 1.8% and the system efficiency goes up by 3%. 
 
The second result compares behavior when everyone knows that no sources of fake news exist 
and when sources of fake news do exist and everyone knows both the sources of fake news and 
the biases. 
 
Table 3  Comparison of reliable (no fake) news condition and known fake news sources 
condition 
condition Total earnings 
$675 maximum 
Earnings per 
person 
Percentage 
correct 
Efficiency 
No fake news $498 $0.83 66.5%  80% 
Known fake 
news sources 
$529  $0.88 69.0%  85% 
 
Result 2.  If news sources have known biases, individuals adjust for the biases and information 
aggregation tends to operate as if there were no bias.  Biased news can be processed and the 
unbiased news content extracted if the biases are fully recognized and understood.  
 
Support.  The support for the Result 2 is found in Table 3. The existence of fake news has no 
impact if people know the sources that are fake. If seeming irrationality or motives are 
understood, observers just modify the information according to the reliability of the 
information source. Here the comparisons are substantially along the lines of #1.  
i. With known fake news numbers of correct decisions as comparable to no fake news Compare 
69% (fake news) vs. 66.5% (no fake news) (Z score 0.927 p value 0.177) 
Table 2  Comparison of private information condition and  
the no fake news condition  
condition Total earnings 
Earnings per person 
per round 
Percentage 
correct Efficiency 
Private Information Only $476  $0.79  64.7% 77% 
No fake news $498  $0.83  66.5% 80% 
11 
 
ii. earnings are comparable between no fake news and known fake news- no statistical 
difference between earnings per person of no fake and known fake. compare – not different 
with 83% confidence, z=0.9374 
iii. information use in decisions is comparable – comparison of the Bayesian use of other’s 
decisions as opposed to private information suggests similarities between no fake news and 
known fake news environments. Compared to the theoretically perfect information aggregation 
(cascade), no fake news/known fake news achieve 82.5% and 87.4% efficiencies 
 
Of course, issues exist regarding the nature of the bias.  Bias can exist in many forms including 
use of the language, illustrations, opinions advanced as reported facts, exposure frequency, 
location in a new source, etc.  The question posed here is if a bias has an impact when it is 
obviously a bias. Is there a natural tendency to translate the message; remove the obvious bias 
and extract the accurate content?  Result 2 demonstrates that bias removal is clearly within a 
natural scope of individual human capabilities. 
 
The third result studies the case in which biases are known to exist but the sources of fake news 
are unknown.  The public information carries no obvious method of determining reports that 
represent fake news from reports that are accurate. The consequences are reductions in 
earnings and efficiency. 
 
Table 4  Comparison of reliable (no fake) news condition and fake news (fake news sources 
unknown) condition 
condition Total earnings 
$X maximum 
Earnings per 
person 
Percentage 
correct 
Efficiency 
No fake news $498 $0.83 66.5% 80% 
Unknown fake 
news sources 
$456 $0.76 63.0% 74% 
 
Result 3. The effect of fake news is to substantially diminish or to terminate information 
aggregation and remove the benefits of the use of available information.  Basically, the impact 
of fake news is to destroy the benefits of the news system.  The system performance returns to 
the base condition in which a public news process does not exist referenced in Table 1. 
Individual decisions do not benefit from the information held by others. 
 
Support.  The support for Result 3 is found in Table 4.  When compared to a system of reliable 
news (no fake news) the performance becomes degraded in all dimensions.  Total earnings and 
average earnings fall. The percentage of correct decisions falls as does system efficiency. (Z 
score 1.29 p-value 0.099) Additionally, compared to the baseline case of no public news, the 
earnings and the percentage of correct choices are lower.  
 
The next result, Result 4, addresses the use of news sources and demonstrates that the impact 
of fake news works through a shift from decisions based on the aggregation of information 
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found in the news to the less informative, private sources of information.12 The result illustrates 
that in the absence of fake news the public news is used for decisions.  However, in the 
presence of unidentifiable fake news the public news sources are abandoned in favor of news 
produced by private sources. 
 
Bayes Law is used as a model of how decision data are incorporated into individual decisions 
(Grether, 1980, 1992).  The following definitions are needed. 
 
Let A be defined as the event that urn A is the actual urn, and let B be defined as the event that 
urn B is the actual urn. Let xit = (ait, dit) be the information of individual i at position t, such that 
ait is defined as the information (the number of A and B choices made by those ahead) that 
individual i has observed from individuals at positions previous to t, and dit is defined as the 
private draw of individual i at position t. While ait and dit are correlated with each other, they 
are conditionally independent given a particular state of the world (A or B). Using Bayes Law, 
we obtain the following. 
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) 
Taking logs and rearranging: 
(1)                      𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ ln �𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ln �𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)� + 𝛾𝛾 ln �𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)� + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the belief about the state of the world given 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Note that  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)� = 0 is 
canceled out since P(A) = P(B) = ½ from the initial priors. From the data, we can apply equation 
(1) and find 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, and 𝛾𝛾.  
 
We want to determine if 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 coefficients differ under different trial conditions (specifically 
comparing the earnings of news conditions “no reverse” with the “known reverse” and 
“unknown reverse”). The key variable, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the private information, is measured as +1 or -1 
depending on the signal the subjects receive. Similarly𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the public information in reports 
available to subject i at position t is measured by the difference in observed actions measured 
as (1 or -1) depending on the report. 
 
Define 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the private signals each individual i receives at position t (1 or -1) and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖1, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2,⋯𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1)) as the signals all individual from position 1 to t-1 received. Then 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃𝑃�∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−1𝑘𝑘=1 |𝐴𝐴�
𝑃𝑃�∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖−1
𝑘𝑘=1 |𝐵𝐵�. In other words, sufficient statistic for calculating the posterior odds of the state of 
the world is simply the difference between the number of signals received and the order of the 
signals do not matter.  
 
With the additional assumption that the subjects believe that previous choices were made in 
accordance with private signals, we can use the difference in the number of publicly observed 
                                               
12 Goeree et al (2007) demonstrate the agents tend to overweigh their private signals. 
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choices as a proxy for 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Given such measurements, the variables are bounded: ln �𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)� 
would either be ±0.693 depending on the private signal and ln �𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴)
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐵𝐵)� would range from -
6.931 to 6.931. So we can perform a linear regression after appropriate change in variables.  
 
Result 4. (i) Individuals always place more decision weight on the private sources of information 
than on the public sources of information.  (ii) The relative weight on public information is 
reduced if the condition is changed from either no fake news or known fake news to the 
condition of unknown fake news.   
 
Support.  Table 5 contains the result of the regression using Bayes’ law as expressed in (1) as a 
model. 
 
Table 5: Bayes’ linear regression 
Variable Coefficient s.e. Z-test p-value 
Logit 1: No reverse    
Intercept -0.0897 0.0257 -3.49 0.0005 
Public Information 0.1773 0.0091 19.48 <2e-16 
Private Signal 0.7159 0.0369 19.41 <2e-16 
Ratio 4.0380    
Logit 2: Known reverse     
Intercept -0.0216 0.0261 -0.83 0.4070 
Public Information 0.1808 0.0092 19.62 <2e-16 
Private Signal 0.6822 0.0382 17.86 <2e-16  
Ratio 3.7727    
Logit 3: Unknown reverse     
Intercept -0.0210 0.0193 -1.09 0.2770 
Public Information 0.1229 0.0119 10.35 <2e-16 
Private Signal 1.1914 0.0282 42.33 <2e-16  
Ratio 9.6981       
 
Overall, we observe that the regression coefficients stated in (1) are similar for ‘no reverse’ and 
‘known reverse’ condition meaning that under those two conditions individuals give public and 
private information about the same weight when making their own decision. Specifically, 𝛽𝛽1 
and 𝛽𝛽2 are statistically equivalent to each other (Z score 0.270, p value 0.787) and 𝛾𝛾1 and 𝛾𝛾2 are 
statistically equivalent to each other (Z score 0.635 p value 0.526). However, in the ‘unknown 
reverse’ condition the data measurements from (1) demonstrates both a decreased influence 
of public information and an increased influence of private signal. 𝛽𝛽1 ≈ 𝛽𝛽2 > 𝛽𝛽3 (One tailed test 
between 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 leads to Z score of 3.8439 and p value 0.00006) and 𝛾𝛾1 ≈ 𝛾𝛾2 < 𝛾𝛾3  (One 
tailed test between 𝛾𝛾2 and 𝛾𝛾3 leads to Z score of 10.7242 and p value<10-10).This suggests that 
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in the ‘unknown reverse’ condition, subjects tend to ignore the public information and stick 
with their private signal when making a decision.13 
 
To check for robustness, of the Bayesian model we use a “Direct Measurement” method for 
comparing the relative importance of public information and private signal. Basically, we count 
the number of reports consistent and inconsistent with the information in an individual’s own 
draw.  Let u be the number of reports that a subject i observes which supports d, the private 
draw of i. Conversely, v is the number of reports observed by i that are the opposite of i's 
private draw.  Then we let the public information a(i,u,v) = u-v be a measure of the difference 
between reports in accordance with the private signal and against it. 
 
In the Direct Measurement model the public information is based on the difference of observed 
choices between red(+1) and white(-1). The order is deemed to be irrelevant. The numbers are 
applied in a model to produce the probability of the color ball the individual will choose given 
the numbers the individual observes at the time of choice.  
 
The measurement is taken from a logistic regression on the differences where we choose β and 
γ that best fits 
(2)                     y = �1  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 β ∙ a + γ ∙ d + ε > 0 0                                     𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 
where a is the public information available to the individual at the time of decision, d is the 
private signal and y is the choice variable. ε is the error term distributed by standard logistic 
distribution and y′ = β ∙ a + γ ∙ d + ε is the latent variable which acts as an intermediate step 
towards measuring subjects’ choices. 
 
Note that d={-1,1} and a={x|-9 ≤ x ≤ 9, x is an integer}. The restriction follows from the number 
of subjects and the choices sequences used in the experiment. The individual in the kth choice 
slot has k-1 reports to view and there were 10 subjects in the experiment. 
 
In the (2) the key variable of interest is γ/β ,which is the relative weight of the private signal 
relative to one unit of public information.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 The intercept (α) is statistically equivalent to zero for both ‘known reverse’ and ‘unknown reverse’ condition. 
This is to be expected if the subjects do not have a bias for Red or White once public information and private 
signals are taken into consideration. The fact that the intercept is non-zero for the ‘no reverse’ condition is quite 
odd but the effect size is not that large since the bias corresponds to about 4% swing in probability. 
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Table 6: Direct Measurement logit regression model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The completed regression produces a binary prediction of the subjects’ choice based on the 
coefficients. In other words, the estimated parameters for γ  and β are given as β
�  and γ�. Then 
for all sets of private signal and publicly observed information (a,d), if β
�
∙ a + γ� ∙ d>0, subjects 
are predicted to choose red (+1), if β
�
∙ a + γ� ∙ d<0, then subjects are predicted to choose 
white(-1). 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the direct measurement model’s prediction agrees with the actual 
subjects’ behavior. The horizontal axis displays the net public information. i.e., [{the number of 
observed public reports that agree with the subject’s private signal} minus {the number of 
observed public reports that disagree with the subject’s private signal}]. The stacked bar graph 
shows the subjects’ choices that were correctly predicted by the model in blue and that were 
incorrectly predicted in grey. 
 
Variable Coefficient s.e. Z-test p-value 
Logit 1: No reverse    
Public 
Information 1.1605 0.1097 10.58 <2e-16 
Private Signal 3.313 0.2948 11.24 <2e-16 
Ratio 2.855    
Logit 2: Known reverse     
Public 
Information 1.0852 0.1035 10.49 <2e-16 
Private Signal 2.9449 0.2613 11.27 <2e-16 
Ratio 2.714    
Logit 3: Unknown reverse     
Public 
Information 1.1717 0.1475 7.946 1.92e-15 
Private Signal 5.0822 0.422 12.043 <2e-16 
Ratio 4.337       
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Figure 1: Count of correctly and incorrectly predicted actions according to model 
 
The model correctly predicts 92.8% of subjects’ choices pooled across all settings. Most of the 
“incorrect” prediction occurs when the subjects observe a net of -2 or -3 public information 
that goes against their private signal.  
 
Furthermore, the model can be used to augment the binary prediction by adding 
measurements of how the choice probability changes according to the different levels of public 
information encountered.  The figures show the actual proportion of subjects choosing 
according to their private signals (blue solid line) in contrast to the choice probability model 
derived from the logit regression (pink dashed line). The horizontal axis displays the net public 
information as before. 
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Figure 2: Probability of choosing in accordance with private signal (no reverse) – Data and Logit 
model prediction 
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Figure 3: Probability of choosing in accordance with private signal (known reverse) – Data and 
Logit model prediction 
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Figure 4: Probability of choosing in accordance with private signal (Unknown reverse) – Data 
and Logit model prediction 
 
We can observe that the regression model fits the data well across all settings. This provides 
additional validity to our usage of ‘direct measurement’ model. 
 
Specifically, the ratio of γ/β tells us the answer to the question “How strong should the public 
information be in order for the majority of subjects to go against their private signals?”. In the 
‘no reverse’ and ‘known reverse’ case, the answer is somewhere between 2 and 3 while for the 
‘unknown reverse’ case, a signal strength of 4~5 is required. 
 
While the result itself is intuitive in that people would put more emphasis on their private signal 
in the face of uncertainty, the difference between the settings is more pronounced than the 
numbers simply suggest.  
 
In the ‘no reverse’ and ‘known reverse’ case, 21% of the subjects chose to go against their 
private signal while in the ‘unknown reverse’ case, that number drops to 7%, 1/3 of the value. 
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The reason for this big change is that the ‘unknown reverse’ setting has two effects. The first 
one, as mentioned, is that subjects put more emphasis on their private signals. The second one 
is that the introduction of reverse incentives itself inherently reduces the probability of a strong 
public information, even by chance. In the ‘no reverse’ case even if everybody were naïve and 
relied on their own private signals, the fourth subject would observe -3 public signal with 12% 
probability. In the ‘unknown’ reverse case, this is reduced to 4%. The lack of cascade in the 
‘unknown reverse’ case is a crucial feature. 
 
G. Summary of Conclusions 
 
Current news providers appear to be engaged in a war with each devoting resources to 
illustrate that the other side is guilty of producing fake news.   Each provides evidence that the 
other side does not produce reliable news and that the other side uses subtle tools to avoid 
being detected. Conflicts of this sort have properties that game theorists term a “war of 
attrition” that is wasteful as are all wars and ends only when a “winner” emerges and collects 
all resources that survived.  In the case of fake news, the damage might be to the news system 
itself as the public loses confidence in the reliability of information delivered through the news.  
Basically, the experiment suggests that the fears and negative prognostications appear to be 
justified and that the damage will not be repaired immediately. 
 
The experiment reported here draws on research found in the information aggregation 
literature from economics and finance.  Information dispersed across many observers becomes 
aggregated in the form of a signal that can be valuable in worlds of decision making under 
uncertainty.  The aggregation can be mistaken but on average it represents and improvement 
and when source reliability is known automatic recovery is possible (Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers 
and McKelvey (2007). The experiments demonstrate that fake news can undermine the 
foundation of the process when source reliability is unknown.  
 
Three experiments were conducted. The first involved no fake news and in this case the 
experiments demonstrated that subjects learned to rely on public news sources because such 
reliance improved their income.  The second experiment introduced reverse incentives for 
some news sources that gave the incentive to produce false reports.  In this experiment 
subjects knew which reporters had reverse incentives and as a consequence subjects adjusted 
and translated the report so the proper news was extracted.  The report from a source known 
to be biased toward x was properly translated to y.  The result was that fake news had no 
effect. 
 
The third experiment removed information about source reliability.  Incentives of all individuals 
were unknown but the possible existence of reverse incentives was known.  Information use 
shifted away from public sources to private sources.  The advantage of information aggregation 
was lost. As a result, this third experiment removed the advantages of public news sources and 
information aggregation. The profits made by participants decreased and were comparable to if 
they had only private information. 
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The lesson here is that some of the advantages of public news are derived from known 
principles of behavior found operating in many places in the economy.  In part these principles 
depend on a trusted connection between reporters' incentives and the information they are 
capable of reporting.  Fake news destroys that relationship and consequently carries 
implications beyond the fact that some people lie.  
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SECTION I APPENDICIES  
INSTRUCTIONS 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
 0=normal   
INSTRUCTIONS POWERPOINT: 
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